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Abstract 
 
State Attorneys General have emerged as influential political actors on the 
national level in the last 25 years. State attorneys general seek to influence policy at the 
federal level in both partisan and bipartisan manners. Media attention in recent years 
and previous scholarship has focused mostly on areas of partisan conflict between and 
among state attorneys general. This paper seeks to explore areas of bipartisan 
cooperation among state attorneys general as demonstrated through the practice of 
signing multistate advocacy letters addressed to Congress, administrative agencies, 
and the private sector that are coordinated through the efforts of the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG. The intention of this thesis is to analyze the 
mean percentage of signatures by state attorneys general on NAAG multistate letters 
from 2009 to 2020 in order to identify trends that can shed light on the practice of 
signing multistate advocacy letters and whether partisan political considerations have 
impacted the practice.  3 research questions, corresponding to independent variables, 
seek to evaluate whether there are statistically significant differences between political 
parties, elected or appointed AGs, and those running for office or not in the practice of 
signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
State attorneys general increasingly influence politics and policy at the national 
level, through both partisan conflict and bipartisan cooperation. Previous research on 
state attorneys general and their attempts at influence has focused on instances of 
partisan conflict—a notable example being a lawsuit filed by Texas Attorney General 
Ken Paxton in December 2020 seeking to invalidate election results in other states. 
Flying under the radar at the same time, though, was a bipartisan advocacy letter sent 
to Congress by state attorneys general seeking to encourage passage of legislation 
protecting federal judges and their families— “Daniel’s Law.”1 This thesis seeks to 
evaluate the practice of state attorneys general signing bipartisan advocacy letters 
during the heightened partisan tensions of the Obama and Trump administrations. First 
though, vital context and background information on an elected office once occupied at 
various times by former President Bill Clinton, former Vice President Walter Mondale, 
and incumbent Vice President Kamala Harris.  
The office of state attorney general accords significant authority to an often 
elected, otherwise appointed, partisan politician. State attorneys general are considered 
by some political scientists to rival state governors in power, as state attorneys general 
face fewer normative constraints and limits to advocacy.2 While powers and 
responsibilities vary by jurisdiction, the state attorney general is nominally the chief legal 
officer of each state or territory’s government. Nationally, there are 56 attorneys 
general, including the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories—American 
Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands. State 
attorneys general represent the interests and citizens of their state or territory in court, 
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provide written counsel and guidance to regulatory and administrative bodies of their 
state or territory, and act as public advocates in specialized issue areas—consumer 
protection, antitrust, utility regulation, etc.3 
As then-Delaware Senator Joe Biden once stated, “When the attorneys general 
signed on, people started to pay a lot more attention.” 4 In addition to performing their 
duties within their state or territory’s borders, state attorneys general in the 21st century 
have increasingly sought to influence public policy at the national level and articulate 
their political positions. Though considered “the people’s lawyer” and possessing other 
nominally apolitical responsibilities, state attorneys general in the 21st century have 
become increasingly political actors. Previously, “It just wasn’t an office that garnered 
that type of limelight.” 5 The 2018 elections demonstrated the increased political 
salience of state attorneys general, both in terms of money collected from donors and 
widespread competition in state attorney general races. 2018 was the first election in 
which state attorneys general associations—DAGA and RAGA, detailed further later in 
the paper—threw off the gloves and actively targeted incumbents of the opposing 
party.6  Prior norms had led to an informal agreement to not invest significant amounts 
opposing longtime incumbents. The public breaking of the truce in 2017 marked a 
highwater moment in the increasing partisan tensions among state attorneys general, 
which derived from political activism and influence attempts beyond their borders.  
As political actors, state attorneys general have the potential to generate both 
conflict and cooperation through their influence efforts, generating an uneasy tension 
over the years. Partisan political efforts have in recent years overshadowed the areas of 
bipartisan cooperation among state attorneys general that fulfill their stated mission to 
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act in the public interest and protect citizens. A key organization that continues to 
shepherd bipartisan cooperation is the National Association of Attorneys General 
(NAAG).  
One method through which state attorneys general attempt to influence the 
national agenda in a bipartisan manner is through multistate advocacy letters issued by 
the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). While previous research has 
focused on multistate litigation among state attorneys general, little work has been 
conducted on so-called “soft power” tools in the state attorney general’s arsenal, most 
notably NAAG multistate policy advocacy letters. 
As signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters is not a constitutional responsibility 
for attorneys general and therefore discretionary, the letters provide an opportunity to 
examine the extent of political activity among state attorneys general over time. NAAG 
multistate letters purport to endure as an example of bipartisan cooperation in the public 
interest among state attorneys general who increasingly exploit their positions for 
partisan political activism. The intention of this thesis is to analyze the mean percentage 
of signatures by state attorneys general on NAAG multistate letters from 2009 to 2020 
in order to identify trends that can shed light on the practice of signing multistate 
advocacy letters and whether partisan political considerations have impacted the 
practice. Through three independent variables—political party identification, method of 
selection for the office, and whether the officeholder is running for office, re-election or 
otherwise—I will compute mean percentages of signatures for state attorneys general 
yearly from 2009 to 2020, and determine if any statistically significant differences 
emerge that can shed light on state attorneys general and whether the practice of 
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signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters remains a bulwark of bipartisan cooperation 
in the public interest. 
Before conducting my analysis, a review of the literature follows that seeks to 
place the increase in political activity by state attorneys general in historical context, 
from the late 20th century to the Obama and Trump administrations, where state 
attorneys general have become “entrenched as integral policymaking actors in the 
United States.” 7 After a discussion of the heightened trends in political activity and 
partisanship by state attorneys general, I will touch on areas of policymaking in which 
norms of bipartisan cooperation among state attorneys general have prevailed. 
Following the literature review will be a methodology section transitioning into the 
analysis, proceeded by discussion of results and conclusion.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Initial Political Activism By State Attorneys General 
 
 State attorney general political activism correlates closely with trends in 
American federalism in the 20th century. As noted expert on state attorneys general 
Paul Nolette writes, “the cooperative federalism of the 1960s gave way to the coercive 
federalism of the 1970s and beyond…” .8 The increase in top-down federal regulatory 
dictates—unfunded mandates, preemption, etc.—fueled increased partisan polarization 
at the federal level, and led to state policymakers identifying closer with federal 
policymakers ideologically. Amidst this, activist state attorneys general saw opportunity 
to challenge federal policy directly, starting during the Reagan administration.9 Amidst 
what one scholar labels the era of “New Federalism” where traditionally federal 
responsibilities began devolving to the states, state attorneys general evolved from 
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independent, state-focused actors to collaborative, interstate activists seeking to shape 
federal policy towards their interpretation of the public’s interest.10 Beginning to stake 
out roles as federal policy influencers in the 1980s laid the groundwork for what would 
become a watershed moment for state attorneys general: targeting the tobacco industry 
in the late 1990s.  
Targeting Big Tobacco 
 
 Starting in 1994, state attorneys general individually filed lawsuits against major 
tobacco companies, seeking to redress the public health damages to citizens in their 
states that the companies were known to be aware of and had long neglected.  When 
Mississippi’s Michael Moore filed the first tobacco lawsuit in 1994, it was seen as 
unconventional, and “more than a way to recover the state’s health expenses.” 11 The 
state attorneys general saw an opportunity to step in and regulate through litigation an 
industry not operating in the public interest that the federal government was not being 
aggressive enough towards. State attorneys general were capitalizing on their 
successful, yet isolated, influence efforts in the 1980s, and pushing the office of state 
attorney general to the forefront of the national agenda as policymaking actors. As more 
state attorneys general filed lawsuits, “lines of stress were increasingly obvious as the 
far-flung attorneys general staked out their positions,” 12 and the need for collaboration 
became evident. Collaborative efforts, spearheaded by Vermont’s James Tierney and 
NAAG, resulted in the largest civil litigation settlement in American history in 1998, the 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. While the settlement cemented state attorneys 
general as actors at the national level, dissent from some attorneys general in the 
tobacco lawsuits portended growing partisan polarization among state attorneys 
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general. The influence of state attorneys general on federal policy soon became 
clouded by and tinged with partisan polarization that has gradually increased during the 
21st century, and is arguably at an all-time high currently.   
RAGA, DAGA, and Partisanship 
 During the tobacco litigation, Alabama Attorney General William Pryor emerged 
as the most vocal dissenter, arguing that state attorneys general were overreaching and 
acting where legislative power would be more appropriate. “What we’re talking about is 
a political problem, not a legal problem,” said Pryor.13 Frustration among Republican 
attorneys general, including Pryor, about perceived partisan overreaches by Democratic 
attorneys general targeting business interests—many of whom were donors to 
Republican attorneys general—led to the founding of the Republican Attorneys General 
Association (RAGA)—a federal political action committee— in 1999. Upon founding 
RAGA and serving as its first treasurer, Pryor stated “Hopefully it (RAGA) will help elect 
more conservative and free market-oriented attorneys general.”14 Democratic attorneys 
general responded by founding the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA) 
in 2002. DAGA began as a part-time political action committee and paled in comparison 
financially and influence to RAGA throughout much of the 2000s.15 RAGA drew on the 
strength of its donors—most significantly corporate business interests—and began 
raising vast amounts of money to influence state attorney general elections nationwide 
during the 2000s, most notably during the presidency of Barack Obama. In an 
increasingly polarized political environment, indifference to the partisan identity of the 
attorney general no longer applied. “The stakes are too high for us to leave winnable 
races on the table,” a former RAGA Executive Director stated.16 
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RAGA’s electoral success led to Democratic attorneys general—who had long 
held a majority of state attorney general seats nationwide—losing their majority in 2012, 
and Republicans holding a majority of state attorney general positions by 2015.17 In the 
words of one former attorney general, “Over time, it (RAGA) has gone from being an 
ideological entity and has become more of an extension of the Chamber of Commerce.” 
18 The electoral success of Republican attorneys general increasingly led them to assert 
themselves at the national level via multistate lawsuits during the Obama presidency, a 
period that set a precedent for antagonism between presidents and attorneys general of 
the opposing party.  
State Attorney General Partisanship During The Obama Presidency 
 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) established that 
state attorneys general have “special solicitude” when suing the federal government, 
setting formal precedent for state attorneys general to sue the federal government in 
attempts to influence policy.19 60 multistate lawsuits, led by Republican attorneys 
general, were brought against the Obama administration over his two terms, a number 
which doubled from the first to the second term.20 According to Paul Nolette, “in 
Obama’s second term, the scope of AG conflict expanded rapidly.” 21 Not only were 
more multistate lawsuits filed by state attorneys general against the Obama 
administration than any previous, but the policies targeted by the lawsuits were more 
broad than previous lawsuits. These lawsuits reflected “a new willingness on the part of 
conservative AGs to challenge a breadth of federal policies…” .22 Thus, the Obama 
administration was a significant period in which state attorneys general expanded their 
powers through filing more multistate lawsuits that reflected acute partisan divisions, 
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departing from previous bipartisan lawsuits in the public interest. While Republicans led 
the activism of state attorneys general during the Obama administration, Democrats 
reciprocated during the Trump administration to a similar, if not greater, degree.  
State Attorney General Partisanship During The Trump Presidency 
 Democratic state attorneys general imitated the tactics of their Republican 
colleagues during the Trump administration, filing in 2017 alone over 50 percent more 
lawsuits against the administration than were filed in total against either the Bush 43 or 
Obama administrations.23 Democratic state attorneys general anticipated some of the 
controversial policies of the Trump administration—on immigration and the environment, 
for example— and quickly filed lawsuits challenging them. Describing the practice of 
filing legal challenges to Trump administration policies, California attorney general 
Xavier Becerra notably stated, “I see it as a team sport.”24 Indeed, the position of state 
attorney general has evolved into what one scholar describes as “a veto point frustrating 
administration policies.”25 As former Vermont attorney general James Tierney has said, 
“…whether it’s suing the president or not suing the president, that’s huge, and so that’s 
what attracts the media attention.”26 “Fighting the feds” has politicized an office some 
once derided as the “state dogcatcher.”27 The increase in partisan political activism by 
state attorneys general during the Obama and Trump presidencies, however, 
overshadows the areas of bipartisan cooperation among state attorneys general that 
have endured. 
Areas of Bipartisan Cooperation Among Attorneys General 
 Areas of state attorney general bipartisan cooperation when attempting to 
influence federal policy have focused on criminal law enforcement and consumer 
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protection issues. In addition to filing multistate lawsuits targeting corporate fraud 
occurring in multiple states, Democratic and Republican state attorneys general have 
frequently filed similar amicus briefs in federal court in many significant criminal cases 
with constitutional implications. During the late Obama and early Trump administrations, 
state attorneys general nationwide collaborated on suing pharmaceutical manufacturers 
and distributors in an effort to address the opioid overdose epidemic.28 Shortly after 
President Trump took office, a bipartisan coalition of state attorneys general filed suit in 
federal court against a major for-profit college accreditor, seeking to hold the accreditor 
responsible for the abuses of the for-profit college industry. As Nolette writes, “the 
timing wasn’t coincidental,” and an education policy expert stated “the intervention ( 
lawsuit) serves as a form of insurance.” 29 The state attorneys general here were 
cooperating to insulate what they perceived as a vital criminal investigation from political 
influence. These examples of state attorneys general cooperating on a bipartisan basis 
to influence federal policy stand in contrast to the escalated partisan tensions present 
among state attorneys general during the Obama and Trump presidencies. Alongside 
these bipartisan criminal investigations and multistate lawsuits, state attorneys general 
“have learned to rely on “soft power” tools, jointly authored letters addressed particularly 
to members of Congress and to federal agencies.”30  
NAAG Multistate Letters and “Soft Power” 
 Using “soft power”—in the form of signing NAAG Multistate Letters—to influence 
federal policy through Congress and the administrative agencies, “reflects the expanded 
power and policy networks” of state attorneys general.31 State attorneys general have 
used their “soft power” to elevate policy areas they feel the federal government needs to 
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address or is neglecting. 32 These advocacy letters allow attorneys general to “voice 
support or dissent for federal legislation and policy,” and “communicate 
recommendations or requests to industry groups or companies.” 33 Thirty-six of the 56 
state attorneys general must sign the advocacy letter for it to be adopted, and the 
organization only issues letters with bipartisan support. The practice of signing NAAG 
multistate letters began in 2006, at a time of less partisan activity and division among 
state attorneys general. The majority of NAAG multistate letters are written to 
congressional committees and congressional leadership, with a smaller portion written 
to administrative agencies, such as the FCC, and a select few written to influential 
private sector actors, such as Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. 
 Previous research on state attorneys general has focused on the evolution of the 
role and increased partisan political activism among state attorneys general. The aim of 
this thesis is to analyze NAAG multistate advocacy letters, purportedly a bastion of 
bipartisanship that has endured amid the increase in partisan activity during the Obama 
and Trump administrations. The following section details the methodology for my 
analysis of NAAG multistate advocacy letters, detailing the independent and dependent 
variables, research questions, hypotheses, and statistical analysis methods used. 
METHODOLOGY 
To conduct research on the number of NAAG Multistate Letters signed by state 
attorneys general, I began with the NAAG website, with its database of letters archived 
by year.34 After reading each letter briefly, I tracked which state attorneys general had 
signed on to the letter, and collected the information in an Excel spreadsheet for the 
years 2009 to 2020. Three questions directed my research; each focused on a different 
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independent variable. The dependent variable in each question was the mean 
percentage of signatures from 2009 to 2020. Percentages were used in lieu of discrete 
numbers of signatures, as the number of signatures varied year-to-year from a low of 1 
to a high of 14. What follows is a brief explanation of each independent variable, why it 
was used, and its implications.  
Political Party Identification 
My initial research began with asking the question of whether there are 
statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of signatures on NAAG 
multistate advocacy letters between Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. As 
NAAG multistate letters are intended to be bipartisan in nature, significant disparities in 
the composition of signatures on an advocacy letter could indicate departures from 
bipartisanship. As the party holding the majority of state attorney general positions 
shifted from a longstanding Democratic advantage to parity followed soon by a 
Republican majority 35, such shifts could have had implications for the practice of 
signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters. Evaluating whether Democrats signed more 
NAAG multistate letters during their time in the majority and fewer during Republican 
majority, for example, could provide an additional opportunity to evaluate the impact of 
political party identification on the practice of signing NAAG multistate advocacy letters. 
The small number of Independents, mostly from the territories, likely will merely provide 
context, given their numerical disparity. 
 
Question 1: Are there statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of 
NAAG multistate letters signed by Democratic, Republican, and Independent state 
attorneys general from 2009 to 2020? 
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H0: There are no statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate letters signed by Democratic, Republican, and Independent state attorneys 
general from 2009 to 2020.  
H1: Democratic state attorneys general signed a higher mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate letters than Republican and Independent state attorneys general from 2009 to 
2020. 
 
Method of Selection for Office 
State attorneys general are either elected or appointed, with the majority being 
elected. In 43 states, the attorney general is popularly elected. Attorneys general are 
appointed by the governor in five states: Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
and Wyoming. The state legislature in Maine appoints the attorney general, and the 
Tennessee Supreme Court appoints the Tennessee Attorney General.36 Elected 
attorneys general must be politically active within their state, and being politically active 
outside the state—through conflict or cooperation— often helps raise their profiles in the 
minds of voters. State attorney general elections, relative to gubernatorial races and 
other statewide races, “tend to not be high profile.” 37 While partisanship and political 
activism are generally how state attorneys general raise their electoral profile, a 
bipartisan record via signing NAAG multistate letters could have electoral implications 
as well.  
A common colloquialism in state-level politics holds that “A.G.” stands for 
“aspiring governor.” In his paper “When Is A.G. Short for Aspiring Governor?”, Provost 
states that attorneys general running for election “display inherently different levels of 
ambition.” 38 Provost further postulates that “the degree to which AGs are able to be 
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active policy makers in a particular area depends on whether they can successfully 
exploit the political environment.”39 Elected attorneys general have greater incentive 
than appointed attorneys general to value constituent needs, which could influence the 
policy areas they attempt to influence. An attorney general that is elected is “more likely 
to shade their positions closer to the public view.”40 
 In contrast, as a result of not needing to campaign and being less directly 
responsible to constituent needs, appointed attorneys general have more latitude in the 
policy areas they seek to influence. “Appointed attorneys general…are freer generally in 
the expression of opinions on controversial issues…distinct from the growing fear that if 
this is done it may cost votes.”41 The practice of signing NAAG multistate letters and the 
cooperation it purports to reflect could yield a significant difference for elected and 
appointed attorneys general. Elected attorneys general may sign more NAAG multistate 
letters as a way of building a bipartisan record that could come in handy in the next 
election.  
Question 2: Is there a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of 
NAAG multistate letters signed by appointed and elected state attorneys general from 
2009 to 2020? 
H0: There is no statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate letters signed by appointed and elected state attorneys general from 2009 to 
2020. 
H2: Elected state attorneys general signed a higher mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate letters than appointed state attorneys general from 2009 to 2020.  
 
Actively Running for Office or Not 
 
 
- 17 - 
Whether the attorney general— in a state where they are elected—is running for 
re-election or a higher office may influence the practice of signing NAAG multistate 
advocacy letters. Practically speaking, state attorneys general running for office while 
holding office likely will have less available time to read and sign NAAG multistate 
advocacy letters. In “When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor?”, Provost draws on 
literature on “progressive ambition” to yield insights about state attorneys general and 
their electoral ambition. As state attorneys general “have already climbed to a high level 
in state government, it is plausible to argue that they all have high levels of progressive 
ambition.”42 While not every state attorney general runs for higher office, let alone re-
election, similar to the discrepancy between elected and appointed attorneys general 
there could be electoral implications to signing NAAG multistate letters and appearing to 
bolster one’s bipartisan policy record ahead of an election.  
A key assumption underlying the final two independent variables—method of 
selection for office, and whether the officeholder is running for office or not—is that 
activity intended to bolster one’s bipartisan record, signing NAAG multistate letters in 
this case, yields electoral benefits. Most of the literature on the impact of electoral 
incentives approaches the topic from the viewpoint of House of Representatives 
members.43 Unfortunately, literature on electoral implications of bipartisanship for state 
attorneys general is sparse. Through the final two independent variables, this paper 
seeks to hopefully provide some insight into electoral incentives. 
 
Question 3: Is there a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of 
NAAG multistate letters signed by state attorneys general running for office and those 
not running for office from 2009 to 2020? 
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H0: There is no statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate letters signed by state attorneys general running for office and those not 
running for office from 2009 to 2020. 
H3: State attorneys general not running for office signed a higher mean percentage of 
NAAG multistate letters than state attorneys general not running for office from 2009 to 
2020.  
 
Data Collection  
This section will detail my data collection through an example process, which 
subsequently was iterated through each NAAG multistate letter issued from 2009 to 
2020. Following the example, I will discuss limitations in the data and where 
adjustments were made. As stated previously, my starting point was NAAG’s website 
dedicated to their policy letter archive.44 Each letter—accessible as a PDF—contains a 
similar heading section, with the different recipients specified in the opening. The 
attorneys general on the left side lead the Executive Committee for NAAG, membership 
of which rotates on a yearly basis.  
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The majority of NAAG multistate letters are addressed to Congress, with slightly 
more letters sent to particular congressional committees with the capacity to act on the 
desired policy action being advocated for. While many NAAG letters are addressed to 
congressional committees and include the majority and minority leaders in each house, 
other letters are addressed only to the majority and minority leaders, as the subject of 
the letter may be beyond the scope of a committee. For example, a NAAG letter in 
October 2020 concerned the CARES Act and fiscal relief for multiple industries, and 
was addressed to the majority and minority leaders specifically.  
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The body section of NAAG multistate letters details the policy being advocated 
for and marshals supporting evidence, often citing judicial cases and previous acts of 
legislation. For intellectual property protection purposes, I have not included an image of 
the body of a NAAG letter, but the letters generally do not exceed more than five pages 
in total. The signature sections of each letter contain the empirical data that I have used 
in conducting my research. Either the attorney general signed the letter or they did not; 
there are no partial signatures. The signatures are a lifted image on file at NAAG of the 
attorney general’s official signature. Often, the signatures of the attorneys general 
taking an active role and interest in the policy area are listed first—referred to as the 
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 During my review of each letter from 2009 to 2020, I had an Excel spreadsheet 
open in a separate window to record an “R” or “D” where each attorney general from 
each state had signed a letter. Every attorney general’s name, party affiliation, method 
of selection for the office, and whether they were running for office that year were 
included as well.  
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 Some intricacies in the data emerged and merit notice briefly, yet did not impact 
the data collection significantly. An infrequent occurrence was an attorney general 
vacating the office at some point during that year and an acting attorney general filling 
the vacancy. California Attorney General and future Vice President Kamala Harris, for 
example, was re-elected as attorney general in 2014 to a four-year term. She ran 
successfully for U.S. Senate in 2016, vacating the office of attorney general mid-term in 
January 2017. Her replacement, Xavier Becerra, though appointed by the Governor, 
was still considered elected for my data collection, as the office of attorney general was 
still on the ballot in 2018 and Mr. Becerra’s appointment was an unusual circumstance. 
In other instances where an attorney general vacated office at a point during the year, 
the officeholder—either the attorney general or their replacement—who held the 
position for more days in the year was used in my data collection. The Attorney General 
for the District of Columbia was an appointed position until 2014, when it was first 
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popularly elected. Though I do not see it as impacting the data significantly, being only 
one datum, it is worth noting.   
 Upon finishing data collection, I computed mean percentages of signatures on 
NAAG multistate letters for single years alongside the raw total of signatures in a year. 
As the number of letters issued per year varied, I viewed percentages as a way of 
standardizing the data. 2015 and 2016 were outliers, as significantly fewer letters were 
available to sign during those two years before a rebound in 2017. In presenting my 
data as follows, I will proceed in order of the independent variables: political party 
identification, method of selection for office, and whether the officeholder was running 
for office. The first visual presentation will be a line graph showing the change in mean 
percentages of signatures on NAAG letters over the period from 2009 to 2020. 
Following brief discussion of these results, I will present the results of significance 
testing, again followed by brief discussion. 
ANALYSIS 
Question 1: Are there statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of 
NAAG multistate letters signed by Democratic, Republican, and Independent state 
attorneys general from 2009 to 2020? 
H0: There are no statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate letters signed by Democratic, Republican, and Independent state attorneys 
general from 2009 to 2020.  
H1: Independent state attorneys general signed a lower mean percentage of NAAG 
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 From 2009 to 2020, Democratic state attorneys general on average signed more 
NAAG multistate policy advocacy letters than Republicans and Independents. A 
significance analysis using ANOVA indicated a statistical significant difference was 
present for this data set. Subsequent paired t-tests were conducted as well on the 
individual variables. Of the three paired two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variances, 
Democrats and Independents as well as Republicans and Independents showed 
statistically significant differences. Democrats and Republicans produced a one-tail p 
value of 0.05486, close to indicating statistically significance, but not quite.45 The null 
hypothesis can be rejected here, though. 
The clearest conclusion to be drawn is that Independents sign a significantly 
lower mean percentage of NAAG multistate letters than their Democratic and 
Republican colleagues. This was a likely conclusion to be drawn from the sheer 
disparity between the number of Independent state attorneys general and partisan 
identifying state attorneys general. Also contributing could be geographic disparity, in 
that Independent state attorneys general overwhelmingly reside in western states and 
territories. Raw statistics showed territorial attorneys general in particular signing fewer 
advocacy letters. As these territories—Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Northern Mariana 
Islands, United States Virgin Islands, Guam—do not have voting representation in 
Congress, signing onto advocacy letters could be viewed as futile.  
 
Question 2: Is there a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of 
NAAG multistate letters signed by appointed and elected state attorneys general from 
2009 to 2020? 
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H0: There is no statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate letters signed by appointed and elected state attorneys general from 2009 to 
2020. 
H2: Elected state attorneys general signed a higher mean percentage of NAAG 
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*P-value<0.05 
 From 2009 to 2020, there is a statistically significant difference between elected 
and appointed state attorneys general, as elected attorneys general signed a higher 
mean percentage of NAAG multistate advocacy letters than their appointed colleagues. 
As before, this could be explained by the disparate majority of elected attorneys general 
compared to their appointed colleagues. We can reject the null hypothesis in this case, 
but would need more supporting evidence to validate the experimental hypothesis that 
elected attorneys general sign more NAAG multistate advocacy letters than appointed 
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Question 3: Is there a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of 
NAAG multistate letters signed by state attorneys general running for office and those 
not running for office from 2009 to 2020? 
H0: There is no statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate letters signed by state attorneys general running for office and those not 
running for office from 2009 to 2020. 
H3: State attorneys general not running for office signed a higher mean percentage of 
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 From 2009 to 2020, with the exceptions of 2009, 2013 and 2017—no incumbent 
state attorneys general ran for office during those years—there was not a statistically 
significant difference in the mean percentage of NAAG multistate advocacy letters 
signed between attorneys general running for office and those not running for office. As 
detailed in a previous section of the paper, this independent variable sought to evince 
whether electoral incentives—the desire to appear to cooperate in a bipartisan manner 
to voters—influence attorneys general and the practice of signing NAAG multistate 
advocacy letters. While some individual attorneys general running for office appeared to 
sign more advocacy letters, the aggregate did not show statistically significant 
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CONCLUSION 
 During the 21st century, state attorneys general have increasingly attempted to 
influence policy beyond their immediate jurisdictions, resulting in both cooperation and 
conflict among state attorneys general. As much has been made of the conflicts 
between state attorneys general as a symptom of increased partisan polarization, 
comparatively little work has focused on aspects of bipartisan cooperation between 
state attorneys general. Multistate advocacy letters issued through the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) seek to outline a desired policy or policy 
change—often addressed to Congress and regulatory agencies—and are signed by 
individual attorneys general.  
 This thesis sought to identify whether there are statistically significant differences 
in the mean percentage of NAAG multistate advocacy letters issued during the Obama 
and Trump administrations (2009-2020)—two administrations colored by partisan 
polarization—through three independent variables: political party identification, method 
of selection for the office, and whether the officeholder is running for office. The analysis 
conducted utilized NAAG’s database of advocacy letters, and extrapolated statistics on 
the number of signatures on the letters into an Excel spreadsheet. Once a range of 
mean percentages of signatures was calculated, t-tests of statistical significance and an 
ANOVA were performed using a significance level of p<.05.  
 For Q1, asking whether there were statistically significant differences between 
Republican, Democratic, and Independent attorneys general in the mean percentage of 
NAAG multistate advocacy letters signed, the ANOVA performed came close to 
indicating statistical significance. Follow-up paired t-tests, though, showed a statistically 
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significant difference when the mean percentages of Independents were one of the 
pairs. For Q2, asking whether there was a statistically significant difference  between 
elected and appointed state attorneys general in the mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate advocacy letters signed, the t-test demonstrated a statistically significant 
difference between elected and appointed state attorneys general. Elected attorneys 
general signed a significantly higher mean percentage than appointed attorneys 
general. Lastly, for Q3—asking whether there was a statistically significant difference 
between attorneys general running for office and those not running with respect to the 
mean percentages of NAAG multistate advocacy letters signed—there was not a 
statistically significant difference.  
 This thesis lends credence to the claim that attorneys general who identify as 
Independent sign a statistically significant lower percentage of NAAG multistate 
advocacy letters, while Democrats and Republicans differ, but not to a statistically 
significant degree. Sample size disparities cast some doubt on these claims, as there 
are fewer Independent attorneys general than Democrats and Republicans cumulatively 
in the population. A similar effect, though to a lesser extent, can be imputed to the 
second claim: that elected attorneys general sign a higher mean percentage of NAAG 
multistate advocacy letters than their appointed counterparts. The effect of these 
sample size disparities could be reduced by regression if replicated in the future. The 
third independent variable—whether the officeholder was running for office or not—
produced more equitable samples, but could be further refined to delineate between re-
election and other races.  
 
 
- 32 - 
 While it is too early to evaluate policy influence efforts by state attorneys general 
in the Biden administration, it is reasonable to envision Republican attorneys general 
increasingly challenging the administration, mirroring their Democratic colleagues during 
the Trump administration.46 With no clear, parsimonious path out of heightened partisan 
polarization in U.S. politics—at all levels of government—it is likely that political 
incentives produced by conflict among state attorneys general will outweigh any 
incentives of bipartisan cooperation, such as NAAG multistate advocacy letters. The 
role of state attorney general will likely continue to attract more ambitious politicians 
who recognize the potential efficacy afforded the position as a means of advancement. 
No longer the “state dogcatcher” the state attorney general has been positioned as a 
underappreciated, yet influential office, and will present opportunities for further 
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